Abstract. In this work, we apply the rebound attack to the AES based SHA-3 candidate Lane. The hash function Lane uses a permutation based compression function, consisting of a linear message expansion and 6 parallel lanes. In the rebound attack on Lane, we apply several new techniques to construct a collision for the full compression function of Lane-256 and Lane-512. Using a relatively sparse truncated dierential path, we are able to solve for a valid message expansion and colliding lanes independently. Additionally, we are able to apply the inbound phase more than once by exploiting the degrees of freedom in the parallel AES states. This allows us to construct semi-free-start collisions for full 
Introduction
In the last few years the cryptanalysis of hash functions has become an important topic within the cryptographic community. The attacks on the MD4 family of hash functions (MD5, SHA-1) have especially weakened the condence in the security of this design strategy [14, 15] . Many new and interesting hash function designs have been proposed as part of the NIST SHA-3 competition [12] . The large number of submissions and dierent design strategies require dierent and improved cryptanalytic techniques as well.
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At FSE 2009, Mendel et al. published the rebound attack [10] -a new technique for analysis of hash functions which has been applied rst to reduced versions of the Whirlpool [2] and Grøstl [4] compression functions. Recently, the rebound attack on Whirlpool has been extended in [8] , which in some parts is similar to our attack. The main idea of the rebound attack is to use the available degrees of freedom in the internal state to eciently fulll the low probability parts in the middle of a dierential trail. The straight-forward application of the rebound attack to AES based constructions allows a quick and thorough analysis of these hash functions.
In this work, we improve the rebound attack and apply it to the SHA-3 candidate Lane. The hash function Lane [5] uses an iterative construction based on the Merkle-Damgård design principle [3, 11] and has been rst analyzed in [16] .
The permutation based compression function consists of a linear message expansion and 6 parallel lanes. The permutations of each lane are based on the round transformations of the AES. In the rebound attack on Lane, we rst search for dierences and values, according to a specic truncated dierential path. This truncated dierential path is constructed such that a collision and a valid expanded message can be found with a relatively high probability. By using the degrees of freedom in the chaining values, we are able to construct a semi-free-start collision for the full versions of Lane-256 with 2 96 compression function evaluations and memory of 2
88
, and for Lane-512 with 2 224 compression function evaluations and memory of 2
128
. Although these collisions on the compression function do not imply an attack on the hash functions, they violate the reduction proofs of Merkle and Damgård, and Andreeva [1] . 2 
Description of Lane
The cryptographic hash function Lane [5] is one of the submissions to the NIST SHA-3 competition [12] . It is an iterated hash function that supports four digest sizes (224, 256, 384 and 512 bits) and the use of a salt. Since Lane-224 and Lane-256 are rather similar except for truncation, we write Lane-256 whenever we refer to both of them. The same holds for Lane-384 and Lane-512.
The hashing of a message proceeds as follows. First, the initial chaining value H −1 , of size 256 bits for Lane-256, and 512 bits for Lane-512, is set to an initial value that depends on the digest size n and the optional salt value S. At the same time, the message is padded and split into message blocks M i of length 512 bits for Lane-256, and 1024 bits for Lane-512. Then, a compression function f is applied iteratively to process message blocks one by one as H i = f (H i−1 , M i , C i ), where C i is a counter that indicates the number of message bits processed so far. Finally, after all the message blocks are processed, the nal digest is derived from the last chaining value, the message length and the salt by an additional call to the compression function. 
The Compression Function
The compression function of Lane-256 transforms 256 bits (512 in the case of Lane-512) of the chaining value and 512 bits (resp. 1024 bits) of the message block into a new chaining value of 256 bits (512 bits). It uses a 64-bit counter value C i . For the detailed structure of the compression function we refer to the specication of Lane [5] . First, the chaining value and the message block are processed by a message expansion that produces an expanded state with doubled size. Then, this expanded state is processed in two layers. The rst layer is composed of six permutation lanes P 0 ,. . . ,P 5 in parallel, and the second layer of two parallel lanes Q 0 , Q 1 .
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The Message Expansion
The message expansion of Lane takes a message block M i and a chaining value H i−1 and produces the input to six permutations P 0 ,. . . ,P 5 . In Lane-256, the 512-bit message block M i is split into four 128-bit blocks m 0 , m 1 , m 2 , m 3 and the 256-bit chaining value H i−1 is split into two 128-bit words h 0 , h 1 as fol-
Each of these 128-bit values, as in AES, can be seen as 4 × 4 matrix of bytes.
In the following, we will use the notion x[i, j] when we refer to the byte of the matrix x with row index i and column index j, starting from 0. The complete round transformation consists of the sequential application of all these transformations in the given order. The last round omits AddConstant and AddCounter. Each of the permutations P j consists of six rounds in the case of Lane-256 and eight rounds for Lane-512.
The permutations Q 0 and Q 1 are irrelevant to our attack because we will get collisions before these permutations. An interested reader can nd a detailed description of Q 0 and Q 1 in [5] . 3 The Rebound Attack on Lane
In this section rst we give a short overview of the rebound attack in general and then, describe the dierent phases of the rebound attack on Lane in detail.
The Rebound Attack
The rebound attack was published by Mendel et al. in [10] and is a new tool for the cryptanalysis of hash functions. The rebound attack uses truncated differences [6] and is related to the attack by Peyrin [13] on the hash function Grindahl [7] . The main idea of the rebound attack is to use the available degrees of freedom in the internal state to fulll the low probability parts in the middle of a dierential path. It consists of an inbound and subsequent outbound phase.
The inbound phase is an ecient meet-in-the-middle phase, which exploits the available degrees of freedom in the middle of a dierential path. In the mostly probabilistic outbound phase, the matches of the inbound phase are computed backwards and forwards to obtain an attack on the hash or compression function. Usually, the inbound phase is repeated many times to generate enough starting points for the outbound phase. In the following, we describe the inbound and outbound phase of the rebound attack on Lane.
Outline of the Rebound Attack on Lane
Due to the message expansion of Lane, at least 4 lanes are active in a dierential attack. We will launch a semi-free-start collision attack, and therefore we assume the dierences in (h 0 , h 1 ) to be zero. Hence, lane P 3 is not active and we choose P 1 and thus, (b 0 , b 1 ) to be not active as well. The active lanes in our attack on Lane are P 0 , P 2 , P 4 and P 5 . The corresponding truncated dierential path for the P-lanes of Lane-256 is shown in Fig. 4 . This path is very similar to the truncated dierential path for Lane-256 shown in the Lane specication page 34] and shown in Fig. 5 . The main idea of these paths is to use dierences in only one of the parallel AES states for the inbound phases. This allows us to use the freedom in the other states to satisfy the outpound phases. Since we search for a collision after the P-lanes, we do not need to consider the Q-lanes.
The main idea of the attack on Lane is that we can apply more than one ecient inbound phase by using the degrees of freedom and the relatively slow diusion due to the 2 (or 4) parallel AES states of Lane-256 (or Lane-512). The positions of the active bytes of two consecutive inbound phases are chosen such that when merging them, the number of the common active bytes of these phases is as small as possible. Since we can nd many independent solutions for these inbound phases, we store them in some lists to be merged. In the outbound phase of the attack we merge the results of the inbound phases and further, merge the results of all active P-lanes. Note that the merging of two lists can be done eciently. In each merging step, a number of conditions need to be fullled for the elements of the new list. We merge the lists in a clever order, such that we nd one colliding pair for the compression function at the end.
In more detail, we rst lter the results of each inbound phase for those solutions, which can connect both inbound phases (see Fig. 4 ). Then, we merge the resulting lists of two lanes such that we get a collision after the P-lanes, and parts of the message expansion are fullled. Finally, we lter the results of the left P-lanes (P 0 , P 2 ) and the right P-lanes (P 4 , P 5 ), such that the conditions on the whole message expansion are fullled. In the attack, we try to keep the size of the intermediate results at a reasonable size. We need to ensure, that the complexity of generating the lists is below 2 n/2 , but still get enough solutions in each phase to continue with the attack. 
The Inbound Phase
In the rebound attack on Lane, we rst apply the inbound phase for a number of times. Therefore, we will explain this phase and the corresponding probabilities in detail here. In the inbound phase, we search for dierences and values conforming to the truncated dierential path for Lane-256 or Lane-512 shown in Fig. 3 , with active bytes marked by black bytes. We only describe the application of one inbound phase here. In the example of Fig. 3 , we have 16 active S-boxes between state #4 and state #5. It follows from the MDS property of MixColumns, that this path has at least one active byte in each of the 4 corresponding columns prior to the rst, and after the second MixColumns transformation (state #2 and state #7). Note that the active bytes in state #2 and state #7 can also be at any position marked by gray bytes.
In the inbound phase, we rst choose random dierences for the 4 active bytes after the second MixColumns transformation (state #7). These dierences are linearly propagated backward to 16 active bytes at the output of the previous SubBytes layer (state #5). Next, we take random dierences for the 4 active bytes prior to the rst MixColumns transformation (state #2) and linearly propagate forward to 16 active bytes at the input of SubBytes (state #4). Then, we need to nd a match for the input and output dierences of all 16 active S-boxes. For a single S-box, the probability that a random S-box dierential exists is about one half, which can be veried easily by computing the dierential distribution table of the AES S-box (see [10] for more details).
For each matching S-box, we get at least two (in some cases 4) possible byte values such that the S-box dierential holds. Hence, we get at least 2 16 possible values for one full AES state, such that the dierential path for the chosen dierences in state #2 and state #7 holds. In other words, after trying
non-zero dierences of state #2 and state #7, we get at least 2 16 solutions for the truncated dierential path between state #2 and state #7. Hence, the average complexity to nd one solution for the inbound phase (dierences and values) is about 1. Note that this holds for both, Lane-256 and Lane-512.
The Outbound Phase
After we have found dierences and values for each inbound phase of the active lanes, we need to connect these results and propagate them outwards in the outbound phase. In backward direction, we need to match the message expansion at the input of each lane. In forward direction, we need to match the dierences of two P-lanes on each side to get a collision. We describe the conditions for these two parts according to our truncated dierential path in the following.
The Message Expansion. After the inbound phases, we get values and dierences at the input and output of the 4 active lanes P 0 , P 2 , P 4 and P 5 . Since we have zero dierences in (h 0 , h 1 ) and (b 0 , b 1 ), we get using the message expansion for lane P 1 (see Equation (1)):
Hence, we get the following relation for the message dierences in m 0 , m 1 , m 2 , and m 3 :
Using (1) we get for the dierences in the expanded message words (a 0 , a 1 ) and (c 0 , c 1 ):
and thus, the following relations between a 0 , a 1 , c 0 , and c 1 :
Beside the dierences, we also need to match the values of the message expansion. Since we aim for a semi-free-start collision, we can freely choose the chaining value (h 0 , h 1 ) such that the conditions on (a 0 , a 1 ) are satised:
That means we have conditions on the input (c 0 , c 1 ) left, which we need to match with the message words m 0 , m 1 , m 2 and m 3 . Since we can vary lanes P 0 ,P 2 and P 4 ,P 5 independently in the following attacks, we can satisfy these conditions by merging the results of both sides. Using the equations of the message expansion, we get for (c 0 , c 1 ) using the values of (a 0 , a 1 ):
We can rearrange these equations in order to have all terms corresponding to P 0 ,P 2 on the left side and all terms of P 4 ,P 5 on the right side:
For merging the two sides, we will compute, store and compare the following values of each list:
Colliding P-Lanes. In the forward direction, we need to nd a collision for the dierences in P 0 and P 2 , such that ∆P 0 ⊕ ∆P 2 = 0 and for the dierences in P 4 and P 5 , such that ∆P 4 ⊕ ∆P 5 = 0. Note that we can swap the order of the last MixColumns with the XOR operation of the P-lanes since both transformations are linear. Hence, we only need to match the dierences after the last SubBytes layer in each of the two active lanes. The blue bytes in Fig. 4 of Lane-256, or the red, blue and yellow bytes in Fig. 5 of Lane-512 are independent of the inbound phase. Hence, we can use the freedom in these bytes to nd a collision after the P-lanes. . We will use the 6-round truncated dierential path given in Fig. 4 which is very similar to the one shown in the Lane specication [ Fig. 4.2, page 33] . We search for a collision after the P-lanes of Lane and use the same truncated dierential path in the 4 active lanes P 0 , P 2 , P 4 and P 5 . Since we do not consider dierences in h 0 and h 1 , but we x their values, the result will be a semi-free-start collision. The attack on Lane-256 consists basically of the following parts:
1. First Inbound Phase: Apply the inbound phase at the beginning of the truncated dierential path (state #2 to state #7) for each lane P 0 , P 2 , P 4 , P 5 independently. 2. Second Inbound Phase: Apply the inbound phase in the middle of each lane again (state #10 to state #15). 3. Merge Inbound Phases: Merge the results of the two inbound phases (state #7 to state #10). 4. Merge Lanes: Merge the two neighboring lanes P 0 ,P 2 and P 4 ,P 5 and satisfy according dierences of the message expansion. 5. Message Expansion: Merge the two sides (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 4 , P 5 ) and satisfy the remaining conditions on the message expansion (dierences and values). 6. Find Collisions: Choose remaining free values (neutral bytes) to nd a collision for each side (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 4 , P 5 ) independently. 7. Message Expansion: Merge the two sides (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 4 , P 5 ) and satisfy the conditions on the message expansion of the remaining bytes. Fig. 4 are determined, i.e. the dierences as well as the actual values of the bytes are found. Note that we have chosen the position of active bytes in state #0, such that at least one term of Equation (2) or (4) is zero for each byte. At this point, we can compute backwards to state #0 and independently verify the condition on one byte of the input dierences:
The condition on each of these bytes is fullled with a probability of 2 
Merge Inbound Phases
The two previous inbound phases overlap in 8 active bytes (state #7 to state #10). We connect the two inbound phases by checking the conditions on the overlapping bytes of state #10. Since both values and dierences need to match, we get a condition on 128 bits. . Altough we still do not know half of the state, each of these input pairs conforms to the whole truncated dierential path from state #0 to state #24 with a probability of 1. In other words, we know that in state #24, there are at most the given bytes active.
Merge Lanes
Next, we continue with merging the solutions of each lane by considering the message expansion. We rst combine the inputs of lane P 0 and P 2 by merging lists L 0 and L 2 . When merging these lists, we need to satisfy the conditions on the dierences of the message expansion. We have conditions on 5 active bytes of state #0 in lane P 0 and P 2 (see Fig. 4 ). Remember that we have chosen the position of these active bytes, such that at least one term of Equation (2) or (4) is zero. Hence, we only need to check if two corresponding byte dierences are equal. Since we have already veried one byte dierence (see Sect. 4.1), we have 4 byte condition left:
These conditions are fullled with a probability of 2 
Again, if we use hash tables or the previous lists are sorted according to the bytes to match, the merge operation can be performed very eciently. Hence, the total complexity to produce the lists L 02 and L 45 is determined by their nal size and requires an eort of around 2 80 computations.
Message Expansion
For all entries of the lists L 02 and L 45 , the values in 32 bytes and dierences in 10 bytes of each of (a 0 , a 1 , c 0 , c 1 ) and (m 0 , m 1 , m 2 , m 3 ) have been xed (red and black bytes in state #0 of Fig. 4) . Note that the conditions on the dierences of each side on its own have already been fullled (P 0 ↔ P 2 and P 4 ↔ P 5 ). Hence, if we just fulll the conditions on the remaining dierences between P 0 ↔ P 4 , then the conditions on P 2 ↔ P 5 are satised as well. Using Equations (2)- (4), the position of active bytes in Fig. 4 and the already matched dierences of Sect. 4.1 and Sect. 4.4, we only have the following 4 byte conditions left:
Note that we also need to fulll the conditions on the values of the states. Remember that we can freely choose the chaining values (h 0 , h 1 ) to satisfy the values in the rst 16 bytes of the message expansion (a 0 , a 1 ). To fulll the conditions on the 16 bytes of (c 0 , c 1 ) we need to satisfy Equation (5) −160 = 1 result. This result satises the message expansion for all lanes and is a solution for the truncated dierential path of each active lane between state #0 and state #24. However, we do not get a collision at the end of the P-lanes yet, since we do not know the dierences of state #24.
Find Collisions
In this phase of the attack, we search for a collision at the end of the P-lanes (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 4 , P 5 ) using the remaining freedom in the second half of the state. Note that the 16-byte dierence in state #24 is obtained from 8-byte dierence in state #22 with the linear transforms MixColumns and SwapColumns. Hence, the collision space (the 16 bytes where the two lanes dier) has only 2 64 distinct elements. If we take a look at Fig. 4 
Message Expansion
Finally, we need to match the message expansion for the remaining 32 bytes of each side. Hence, we just repeat the same procedure as we did for the rst half of state #0, except that we only need to match the values of 32 bytes but no dierences. Again, we can use the remaining bytes of (h 0 , h 1 ) to fulll the conditions on 16 bytes of (a 0 , a 1 ) . We use the same iterative truncated dierential path as shown in the specication of Lane-512 [ Fig. 4.3, page 34] , which is given in Fig. 5 . Similar to the attack on Lane-256, we search for a collision after the P-lanes and use the same truncated dierential path in the 4 active lanes P 0 , P 2 , P 4 and P 5 . The attack on Lane-512 consists basically of the following parts:
1. First Inbound Phase: Apply the inbound phase at the beginning of the truncated dierential path (state #2 to state #7) for each lane P 0 , P 2 , P 4 , P 5 independently. 2. Merge Lanes: Merge the two neighboring lanes P 0 ,P 2 and P 4 ,P 5 and satisfy according dierences of the message expansion.
3. Message Expansion: Merge the two sides (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 4 , P 5 ) and satisfy the remaining conditions on the message expansion (dierences and values). 4. Second Inbound Phase: Apply the inbound phase in the middle of each lane again (state #10 to state #15). 5. Merge Inbound Phases: Merge the results of the two inbound phases. 6. Starting Points: Choose random values for the brown bytes in state #7 to get enough starting points for the subsequent phases. 7. Merge Lanes: Merge the values of the starting points for the two neighboring lanes P 0 ,P 2 and P 4 ,P 5 and satisfy the according dierences of the message expansion. 8. Message Expansion: Merge the two sides (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 4 , P 5 ) and satisfy the remaining conditions on the message expansion (dierences and values) for the starting points. 9. Third Inbound Phase: Apply the inbound phase at the end of each lane for a third time (state #18 to state #23). 10. Merge Inbound Phases: Merge the results of the three inbound phases and use the remaining freedom in between. 11. Find Collisions: Merge the corresponding two lanes to nd a collision for each side (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 4 , P 5 ) independently. 12. Message Expansion: Merge the two sides (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 4 , P 5 ) and satisfy the conditions on the message expansion of the remaining bytes.
First Inbound Phase
We start the attack on Lane-512 by applying the rst inbound phase to each of the 4 active lanes P 0 , P 2 , P 4 , P 5 independently. In each lane, we start with 8 active bytes in state #2 and 4 active bytes in state #7 and choose 2 84 random non-zero dierences for these 12 bytes (note that we could choose up to 2 96 dierences). We propagate backward and forward to 16 active bytes at the input (state #4) and output (state #5) of the SubBytes layer in between. We get at least 2 84 matches for the inbound phase with a complexity of 2 84 (see Sect. 3.3). For each result, the gray and black bytes in Fig. 5 are determined. Hence, we can already verify the condition on one byte of the input dierences for each lane by computing backwards to state #0:
The conditions on each of the lanes are fullled with a probability of 2
−16
and we store the 2 68 valid matches of each lane P 0 , P 2 , P 4 and P 5 in the corresponding lists L 0 , L 2 , L 4 and L 5 .
Merge Lanes
Next, we continue with merging the solutions of each lane by considering the message expansion. We rst combine the results of lane P 0 and P 2 by merging lists L 0 and L 2 . When merging these lists, we need to satisfy the conditions on the dierences of the message expansion for the following 6 bytes: [2, 6] Since this match is fullled with a probability of 2 
Message Expansion
For all entries of lists L 02 and L 45 , the values in 32 bytes and dierences in 16 bytes of each of (a 0 , a 1 , c 0 , c 1 ) and (m 0 , m 1 , m 2 , m 3 ) have been xed (gray and black bytes in state #0 of Fig. 5 ). Since the conditions on the dierences of each side on its own have already been fullled, we just need to match the conditions on the remaining 6-byte dierences between each side (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 4 , P 5 ): [2, 6] Remember that we can freely choose the chaining values (h 0 , h 1 ) to satisfy the values in the rst 16 bytes of the message expansion (a 0 , a 1 ). To fulll the conditions on the 16 bytes of (c 0 , c 1 ) we need to nd matches for the following values and dierences using lists L 02 and Fig. 5 .
Starting Points
In this phase of the attack, we will compute a number of starting points which we will need for the subsequent steps. For each lane, we choose random values for the 12 bytes in state #7 (marked by brown bytes in Fig. 5 containing the 32 byte values of (a 0 , a 1 , c 0 , c 1 ).
Message Expansion
Finally, we satisfy the conditions of the message expansion on (a 0 , a 1 ) using the values of (h 0 , h 1 ), and use the two lists L 02 and L 45 to satisfy the conditions on (c 0 , c 1 ). Since we need to match 16 
Find Collisions
In this phase of the attack, we nally search for a collision at the end of the P-lanes (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 4 , P 5 ) using the elements of lists L * i . To nd a collision at the end of the P-lanes, we need to match the 16 byte dierences in state #32 of the two corresponding active lanes such that ∆(P 0 ⊕P 2 ) = 0 and ∆(P 4 ⊕P 5 ) = 0. Note that we can satisfy these conditions independently for each side (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 4 , P 5 In this work, we have applied the rebound attack to the hash function Lane.
In the attack we use a truncated dierential path with dierences concentrating mostly in one part of the lanes. Due to the relatively slow diusion of parallel AES rounds, we are therefore able to solve parts of the lanes independently. First, we search for dierences and values (for parts of the state) according to the truncated dierential path and also satisfy the message expansion. Then, we choose values which can be changed such that the truncated dierential path and according message expansion still holds. The freedom in these values is then used to search for a collision at the end of the lanes without violating the dierential path or message expansion.
In the rebound attack on Lane, we are able to construct semi-free-start collisions for full round Lane-224 and Lane-256 with 2 96 compression function evaluations and memory of 2
80
, and for full round Lane-512 with complexity of . Although these collisions on the compression function do not imply an attack on the hash functions, they violate the reduction proofs of Merkle and Damgård, or Andreeva in the case of Lane. However, due to the limited degrees of freedom, a collision attack on the hash function seems to be dicult for full round Lane. 
